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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of ownership characteristics and activities of the audit committee to audit fee. This study 
also uses control variables which include free cash flow, liquidity ratios, profitability ratios, solvency ratios, firm size, 
market -to-book value of equity, and audits quality of manufacture companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the year 
2010 - 2012 are used as the population in this study. Data collection method used was purposive sampling. The 
statistical methods used to analyze the data are the multiple linear regression and results obtained indicate that 
managerial ownership, audit committee activity, firm size, liquidity ratios, profitability ratios affect audit fees. 
Meanwhile, institutional ownership, free cash flow, solvency ratio, and market -to-book value of equity do not affect the 
audit fees significantly.  
Keywords: audit fees, ownership characteristics, the activity of the audit committee. 
1. Introduction  
Attention to the issue of corporate governance has increased significantly since several cases of failure of companies 
listed on the JSE were revealed. Corporate Governance emerged as a reaction to various corporate failures caused by 
poor corporate governance. Corporate governance issues have received significant attention since the financial crisis in 
the middle 1997. Weak implementation of corporate governance was believed as the main reason of economic 
vulnerability that led to worsening economic condition in several Asian countries including Indonesia. Banking crisis in 
Indonesia started in the end of 1997 was not solely caused by economic crisis, but also due to yet implementation of 
Good Corporate Governance and its underlying ethics. Therefore, efforts to restore confidence to Indonesian banking 
sector through reconstruction and reconciliation can have long term and significant effects if they are accompanied by 
the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (Guidance of Indonesian Banking GCG, 2004). The audit 
committee and stock ownership are considered as an alternative chosen to address the issue of corporate governance. 
There has been a variety of studies on the effect of various corporate governance factors over financial reporting and 
audit quality and level of audit fees (Gul and Tsui, 2001, Carcello et al, 2002; Abbott et al, 2003; Tsui et al, 2001). 
Those researches are based on argument that when managers are separated from the owners, managers would act on 
their personal interests and provide false financial reports with 'opportunistic' reason, even if it means harming the 
interests of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The role of high quality audit is very important to limit 
opportunistic managerial behavior (Becker et al, 1998). 
Seeing from the viewpoint of demand-side, governance mechanisms require high-quality audits to reduce agency costs 
and possibility of fraudulent financial reporting which results high audit fee. High audit fee is the result of high quality 
audit conducted to enlarge audit scope and to add numbers of investigated audit evidences in which it will reduce 
detection risk and audit risk.  (Carcello et al, 2002; Abbott et al, 2003). Meanwhile, from the point of view of 
supply-side, other studies found that governance factors intended to lower agency problems in financial reporting 
process and reduce the risk of misstatement of accounting or accounting errors, so that management will be more 
careful in preparing financial statement and will produce a qualified financial statement. This led to the decrease of 
scope of audit work, in which it would lead to the lower cost of audit (Gul and Tsui, 1998; Tsui et al., 2001).  
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The high level of ownership by management encourages managers to produce more relevant information than to 
compile accounting figures opportunistically for personal gain. This resulted in decrease of the inherent risks of material 
misstatement, thereby reducing audit risk and audit fees. The demand for audit services and audit quality is an efficient 
effort to solve contracting problems (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
This study will conduct an analysis based on monitoring argument of shareholders and propose an idea that large 
shareholders will actively monitor and influence the choice of accounting methods and strategies to produce financial 
information. In developing argument, researchers take into account the influence of both supply and demand factors as 
they both allow creating a contradiction relation between ownership characteristics with audit fee. 
Institutional investor has better information than individual investor because its information is valuable and timely 
analized. To fulfill fiduciary responsibilities, institution develops an investment policy and keep monitoring its portfolio. 
Researchers argue that according to point of view from demand side, if institutional shareholders have less than 20% 
(called diffused) of outstanding ordinary shares individually, then the level of supervision of listed companies will be 
lower than institutional shareholders that have more than 20% (called Blockholder). Institutional shareholders 
blockholder, will be more influential and be able to push companies to conduct an audit of high quality to avoid fraud in 
financial reporting. Active surveillance will reduce the risk of congenital and planed audit process so that the cost of 
audit will be lower. Seeing from the point of view of supply side, blockholder shareholders actively monitor companies 
include financial reporting process to reduce the inherent risk of material misstatement, so that the management will 
also use the service of high quality audit to attract big investor which in turn will increase audit fee. However, 
institutional shareholders diffused will not be interested in monitoring companies and its managers’ strategic decisions, 
and will sell their shares if they are not satisfied with the performance of the companies. 
The managers with high ownership are less likely to commit opportunistic management for short-term gain and will be 
more willing to yield valuable financial statement. Gul et al (2003) stated that managerial with high stock ownership is 
less motivated to perform earning management. This opportunistic action will disappear due to an increase in 
managerial ownership, thus reducing the risk of congenital material misstatement and the audit fee.  
The audit committee is not mandatory and not always present in a small company, but for public companies it is 
mandated by the regulation of Indonesian Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency. This obligation 
indicates that the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) wants to increase control to the management of the public 
companies in order to reduce the possibility of material misstatement and decrease the inherent risk and audit risk in 
which it will finally lower the audit fees.  
In this study, researchers use audit committees variable as an independent variable which is measured by number of 
audit committee meetings held by sampling company, as an indicator to the level of supervision and the effectiveness of 
the audit committee as one element of Good Corporate Governance (GCG)’s implementation. 
Based on the said background, the problems formulated in this study are as follow: first, do the characteristics of 
ownership affect the cost of the audit? And second, do the audit committee activities affect the cost of the audit?  
2. Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Institutional Ownership and Audit Fees 
Kane and Velury (2004) argue that institutional investors influence the management in two ways. First, as a provider of 
large capital, they affect the trading of securities by certain percentage so it will impact market price of the stock. Hand 
(1990) ﬁnds that sophisticated investors more accurately interpret information in earnings announcements. Bartov et 
al.(2000) ﬁnd that the pattern of post earnings announcement drift documented in the prior literature (e.g., Bernard and 
Thomas 1990) is reduced as the level of institutional investment increases. They also have influence on the cost of 
capital which is very important for the company's capital structure and component in the assessment of the company. 
Secondly, because of large holding, institutional investors have voting rights that can be used to influence strategic 
managerial decisions.  
Institutional investors typically have better information than individual investors as they obtain specific information 
which is valuable and timely for analysis. To fulfill fiduciary responsibilities, institutions have developed an investment 
policy and monitored their portfolio continuously. Researchers argue that when institutional shareholders individually 
have less than 20% of common shares outstanding, called spread (diffused), the level of supervision of listed companies 
will be lower than that level on institutional shareholders who have 20% or more of common shares outstanding 
(blockholder). When the level of ownership on institutional investors diffuses, shareholders tend to lack desire and 
ability to monitor the activities of the company (mitra et al. 2007). However, if institutional ownership increases, 
institutional block holder will become more influential, forcing companies to perform high-quality audits to prevent 
fraud in financial reporting. In order to reduce uncertainty about the reported ﬁnancial numbers, institutional 
shareholders as a group may demand high-quality audit service (Kane and Velury, 2004) 
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From demand-side perspective, level of investment by blockholder will affect audit fees positively. From supply-side, 
blockholders will actively monitor common activities in the company, including financial reporting process, and 
reduction of inherent risks of material misstatement. These whole activities of blockholders ultimately will cause a 
growth in audit fees. On the other side, small shareholders or diffused shareholders are remain not interested in 
monitoring the company and making managerial strategic decisions, and they even will sell their shares if they are less 
satisfied with the performance of the company. Thus, our H1 hypothesis is: 
H1 = There is significant relationship between institutional ownership and audit fees. 
2.2 There is Significant Relationship between Institutional Ownership and Audit Fees 
2.2.1 Managerial Stock Ownership and Audit Fees 
Managerial ownership is an important factor in resolving agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers with 
high ownership are less likely to perform opportunistic management for short-term gain and will be more willing to 
produce reliable financial statements. Gul et al (2003) stated that the high shareholders ownership by managerial was 
less motivated to perform earnings management. These opportunistic actions will be lost due to an increase in 
managerial ownership that will reduce inherent risks of material misstatement and reduce audit fees. It can be said, that 
from supply-side perspective, there is a negative effect between managerial ownership and audit fees.  
From demand-side, it is stated that managerial ownership has positive effect on audit fees. In companies with high 
managerial ownership, managers request a high quality and wide scope audit to give positive signal about the quality of 
published financial statements. This will provide economic benefits for companies such as: increasing the credit ratings 
of the companies, lowering the cost of capital, reducing control of the creditors, and providing more flexibility for 
managers, which in turn will improve status of the companies in the capital market. Our H2 hypothesis is: 
H2: There is A Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Audit Fees. 
2.3 Audit Committee Activity  
The Audit Committee is a sub-committee of the main board company, usually formed from a non-executive director and 
is responsible for matters relating to financial reporting and auditing (LF Spira, 1999). The main responsibility of the 
audit committee is ensuring the quality of auditing and reporting within the company, therefore, the audit committee 
must primarily consist of independent directors. It is assumed that active audit committee will lower the audit fees 
charged by external auditor because of improvement on control performed by it. Regular meetings between audit 
committee and external auditor are likely to make audit committee remains to update information on auditing and 
accounting. There are some recommendations from NACD (national association of corporate directors) (Abbott et al, 
2003) that: (1) the frequency of meetings is an important component of the effectiveness of the audit committee, (2) the 
frequency of meetings is often used as a proxy craft of the audit committee. Beasley et al (2000) states that fraudulent 
audit committee of company usually has fewer meeting than the audit committee of a non-fraud company (no cheating). 
Abbott et al (2000) found that companies with audit committee that meet at least 4 times a year tend not to restate the 
audited financial statements. Base on the decree of the Chairman of Bapepam No. Kep-643 / BL / 2012, the Audit 
Committee should hold a regular meeting at least once every three (3) months.  However there is another 
contradictive opinion mention that there is a positive influence on the activity of the audit committee towards audit fees 
(Carcello et al, 2002). This happens because the audit committee has interests to give the signal of efficiency, to 
maintain reputation, and to avoid the risk of litigation, with consequences that it will increase the scope of the audit and 
also will increase the cost of the audit. Of these conflicting results, the researchers set the following hypothesis. 
H3: There Is a Relationship between Activities of the Audit Committee and Audit Fees 
3. Methods  
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The population of this study included all manufacture companies whose shares are listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) in 2010-2012. Meanwhile, the samples used in this study were selected based on certain criteria 
(purposive random sampling): 
a. Companies that publish financial statements in IDR (Indonesia currency);  
b. Companies that publish financial statements with periods ending December 31; 
c. Companies that have complete data i.e. data of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, number of audit 
committee meeting in a year, and the amount of audit fees in the year concerned or professional fee.  
3.2 Operational Definition of Variables  
The following is the definition of each variable.  
This study uses audit fees as the dependent variable earned from the cost of professional fees of the company, which in 
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natural logarithmic.  
The independent variable used in this study include:  
1. Institutional Ownership. Institutions could mean insurance companies, investment banks, and other institutions. 
Institutional ownership in this study using a dummy with 0 is the institutional ownership diffused (spread) 
which is less than 20% ownership, while 1 is institutional blockholders ownership of ≥ 20%.  
2. Managerial Ownership. Managerial ownership in this study using the percentage of managers who become 
owners.  
3. Activity of the audit committee. Audit committee activity in this study was measured using the number of audit 
committee meetings in one year.  
Control variables. Control variables used in this study include:  
a. Free cash flow = operating cash flow - capital expenditures - cash dividend  
b. Liquidity ratio: measured using the current ratio or the current ratio (CR) 
Current Ratio = current assets / current liabilities  
c. Profitability ratio: measured using the rate of return on total assets or return on assets (ROA) 
Return on Assets = net income / total assets  
d. Solvency ratio: measured using the ratio of debt or leverage (LEV) 
Leverage = long-term debt / total assets  
e. Market-to-book value of equity (MB) 
Market to Book Value of Equity = market value of equity / total shareholders' equity 
Market value of equity = stock price x number of shares outstanding  
f. Size of company: measured using the natural logarithm of total assets  
g. Audit quality is measured using a dummy =, which the number 0 indicates the company is audited by a 
non-big four public accounting firm and dummy 1 shows the companies are audited by a big four public 
accounting companies. The big four public accounting firm are :  
a) PricewaterhouseCoopers affiliated with Haryanto Sahari  
b) Ernst & Young affiliated with Purwantono, Sarwoko, Sandjaja  
c) Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu affiliated with Osman Bing Satria  
d) KPMG affiliated with Sidhartha, Sidhartha, Widjaja.  
3.3 Regression Model 
We use the following multiple linear regressions to examine the association between audit committee and audit fees. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Carcello et al., 2002;Tsuietal.,2001; Abbott et al., 2003; Mitra et al., 2007), the model 
includes several ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables that proxy for the effect of client size, complexity, and audit risk in the 
analyses. This research used some control variables namely: Free Cash Flow (FCF), liquidity ratio, profitability ratio, 
solvability ratio, market to book ratio, firm size, and audit quality with consideration that there were several factors 
might have relations on audit fees. Therefore, this research needed to examine the effect of ownership characteristics 
and activity of audit committees by including control variables which was proxy for the effect of client size, audit risk, 
and complexity.  
LAFEE = β0+ β1DINST + β2PMGR +  β3AC_MEET + β4LTA+ β5CR+ β6MB+ β7LEV+ β8ROA + β9FCF +  
β10AUDIT_QUALITY+ ε 
Dependent Variable: 
LAFEE : natural logarithm of audit fees  
Independent variable  
DINST : dummy institutional shareholders, the number 0 indicates diffused and dummy 1 shows the blockholder. 
PMGR : the percentage of managerial shareholders  
AC_MEET: number of audit committee meetings that have been done in one year  
Variable Control  
LTA : natural logarithm of total assets  
CR : the current ratio  
MB : the market value of equity divided by total shareholders’ equity  
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LEV : leverage ratio  
ROA : Return on assets  
FCF : free cash flow  
Audit_quality: dummy 0 indicates the company is audited by a non-big four public accounting firm while dummy 1 
shows the companies are audited by a big four public accounting companies.  
In order to make sure the data is Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE), through classical linear regression 
assumption, the result showed that the data was free from normality, heteroskedasticity, autocorellation, and 
multicollinearity, then the use of model to test the hypothesis can be performed, and the results will be described. Test 
of normality used One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test with rule if Asymp. Sig. value ≥ 0.05 then data were 
normally distributed. Test of multicollinearity applied Variance Inflation Variance (VIF) with condition if VIF value < 
10 then it was free from multicollinearity. Test of autocorrelation utilized Durbin-Watson test with condition if 
Durbin-Watson value between du and 4-du, it meant there were no autocorrelation. Test of heteroscedasticity used 
Glejser test with provision of dependent variable was absolute residual, p-value ≥ 0.05 which meant there were no 
heteroscedasticity. 
4. Results and Discussion  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis  
This study uses data pooling and has total observation in period of observation during the years 2010-2012 as many as 
281 observations. Tables 1a and 1b below presents the test results of descriptive statistics for all variables used in this 
study. 
Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics 
 AC_Meet K_MGR FCF CR ROA LEV MB LN_TA LN_FEE 
N 
Valid 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 7.93 1.7303 144897396319.36 7.4832 .0694 .1855 228.8140 28.4631 22.1459 
Median 5.00 .0000 7256550544.00 1.5895 .0631 .1251 1.6951 28.4124 22.0137 
Std. Deviation 8.021 6.52680 1546538593792.077 62.09250 .13032 .31088 2847.13559 1.80231 1.94968 
Minimum 1 .00 -10176000000000 .02 -1.07 .00 -.87 20.37 15.16 
Maximum 57 51.98 8307912000000 1005.18 .58 4.39 47351.29 32.84 26.71 
All data are in IDR. 
Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics of Audit Quality and Institutional Ownership 
 AUDIT _QUALITY D_INST 
N 
Valid 281 281 
Missing 0 0 
Mode 0 1 
Std. Deviation .501 .145 
Dummy audit quality: 0 = non PAF big -4, 1 = PAF big-4. Institutional ownership dummy: 0 = diffused ≤ 20%, 1 = 
blockholders> 20%  
Based on Table 1a, it is shown that mean and median of Ln_ audit fee is 22.1459 and 22.0137 with standard deviation 
of 1.94968 and maximum value (minimum) is 26.71 (15.16). The result describes that the majority of the sampled 
companies, possess a quite high value of audit fee on the average. It is  possible to occur due to the level of audit 
committee activity that is seen on Table 1b showing the low frequency of number of meeting, so that, its role as an 
observer in composing financial report become less effective and lead to the higher audit fee that has to be paid.   
The frequency of meetings (number of meetings) of the audit committee has mean and median of 7.93 and 5.00 with 
standard deviation of 8,021 and maximum value (minimum) is 57 (1). Based on the rules of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BAPEPAM), minimum limit of number of audit committee meeting should be equal to the 
number of meeting for the board of commissioners, which is once in a month.  Since the analysis result delivers low 
number of audit committee meetings with average of 7.93 ≈ 8, the audit committee activity shows its lack of ability in 
performing the role of observer in the process of financial reporting. As a consequence, it has to pay costly audit fees in 
order to get a qualified audit. 
Since the majority sampled companies have greater proportion of institutional ownership that is more than 20% or 
blockholder (shown by dummy 1), they demand a qualified audit to gain their trust in the reliability of the financial 
statement earns.  
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Managerial ownership has mean and median of 1.7303 and 0.0000 with standard deviation of 6.52680 and maximum 
value (minimum) was 51.98 (0.00). It shows that the proportion of managerial ownership of sampled companies is 
considerably low, thus managerial ownership has minor influence on decision-making and corporate issuers have no 
incentive (desire) to participate in the improvement of the quality of the financial reporting process that will affect the 
audit fees charged.  
Free cash flow has mean and median of 144897396319.36 and 7256550544.00 with standard deviation of 
1546538593792.07 and maximum value (minimum) 8.307912 trillion (-10,176,000,000,000). It shows most of sampled 
companies have positive free cash flow level that still can be utilized for investment activities.  
Current ratio (CR), which describes the sampled companies’ liquidity has mean and median amounted to 7.4832 and 
1.5895 with standard deviation of 62.09250 and maximum value (minimum) of1005.18 (0.02). These results illustrated 
that the sampled companies have a positive current ratio level, which means they are in the condition of being able to 
pay the debt that will be immediately due (current debt).  
Profitability ratio (ROA) has mean and median amounted to .0694 and .0631 with standard deviation .13032 and 
maximum value (minimum).58 (-1.07). These results indicate that the sampled companies have a positive return ratio 
over company’s assets, so that company’s investment on their asset will be beneficial for the company.  
The ratio of debt or leverage (LEV), which represents the ratio of solvency, has mean and median.1855 and .1251 with 
standard deviation .31088 and maximum value (minimum) 4.39 (.00). These results indicate that the ratio leverage is 
less than 0.5, so most likely the company issuers have the ability to pay off its long-term debts.  
Market-to-book value of equity ratio (MB) has mean and median 228.8140 and 1.6951 with standard deviation 
2847.13559 and the maximum value (minimum) is 47351.29 (-.87). A positive value greater than 1 indicates that the 
sample companies are managed to increase the value for its shareholders. Ln_total asset value (Ln TA) has mean and 
median 28.4631 and 28.4124 with standard deviation 1.80231 and maximum value (minimum) 32.84 (20.37).  
As for the quality of the audit, the majority of the sampled companies show dummy value worth 0.It shows that the 
majority of sampled company hiring a public accounting firm (PAF) non-big four.  
4.2 Results of Multiple Linear Regressions  
After classical linear regression assumption test, the result showed that the data was normal, free from 
heteroskedasticity, autocorellation, and multicollinearity, then the use of model to test the hypothesis can be performed, 
and the results will be described. 
Table 2. F Test Results 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square Adj R square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 738.817 10 73.882 .683 61.277 .000b 
Residual 325.538 270 1.206    
Total 1064.356 280     
a. Dependent Variable: LN_FEE 
b. Predictors: (Constant), QUALITY_AUDIT, LEV, K_MGR, MB, FCF, D_INST, CR, AC_MEET, LN_TA, ROA 
 
Table 2 shows that all regression models can be used to predict the dependent variable (audit fees). Statistically, it can 
be seen from the F values which is significant at  = 0.05 (0.00 <0.05). It means that the regression model was fit to test. 
The value of adjusted R square which is 0.683 means that the variation of the independent variables has the ability to 
explain variation in the 68.3% dependent variable. While the remaining 31.7% is explained by other variables outside of 
this research. 
4.2.1 The Effect of Institutional Ownership to Audit Fee  
The result in table 3 shows that concentrated Institutional ownership (D_INST) has a p-value ≥ 0.10, so that theH1 
hypothesis which states that institutional ownership effect towards audit fee is not supported. This is not in accordance 
with theory predicted that blockholder actively monitors the company including financial reporting process to reduce 
the inherent risk of material misstatement which will increase the audit fees. Meanwhile, for the minor shareholders 
(diffused) remain not interested in monitoring the company including manager strategic decisions. Instead, they prefer 
to sell their shares if they are less satisfied with the company’s performance. 
In addition, the t-test results of different influence between diffused and blockholder institutional ownership indicate 
that there is no distinctive effect of them both towards the audit fees. This can be seen in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Results of t Test 
Table 4. T-Test Results: Differences between Institutional Ownership Diffused and Block Holder towards Audit Fee 
   
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
    F Sig. T df 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
90% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
    Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower 
LN_FEE Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.976 .161 .747 279 .455 .60188 .80523 -.72701 1.93077 
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    1.079 5.481 .326 .60188 .55801 -.50112 1.70488 
The result obtained is similar to Mitra (2007) which states that there is no difference in the relationship between 
institutional ownership and non-institutional blockholder with the audit fees. This can occur because both the diffused 
shareholder and blockholder demand to buy a high quality audit services to increase their confidence in the reliability of 
financial statements, which as the consequence, the company need to pay higher audit fees. 
4.2.2 Effect of Managerial Ownership towards Audit Fee  
Managerial ownership variable (K_MGR) has a p-value <0.10. This shows that the second hypothesis which says that 
there is an influence of managerial ownership on audit fees cannot be rejected. According the result of t test, managerial 
ownership variable has a positive coefficient. Thus, the higher managerial ownership percentage in a company, the 
higher audit cost becomes. This is not in accordance with the theory that states opportunistic actions by the manager can 
be reduced by an increase in managerial ownership, which will reduce the inherent risk of material misstatement and 
audit fee reduction.  
The relationship of managerial ownership to audit fee in this research showed positive direction. This means that the 
higher the managerial ownership in a company the more expensive its audit fee and vice versa.  Along with the 
increase of managerial ownership, the management will be more motivated to produce a more qualified financial 
reporting. The management will also give positive signal to investors by asking high scope of work that led to a high 
cost audit. This is done so that the investors have confidence in the financial statement prepared by the Management. 
The results of this study are not in accordance with the research partners Mitra Sentanu et al (2007) which prove that 
managerial ownership affects the cost of the audit negatively and significantly. Mitra states that managers with a high 
level of stock ownership does not want to take opportunistic activities. This act will reduce the risk of congenital 
(inherent risk) of material misstatements in the financial reporting process.  
Coefficients a 
Model Unstandardized  Coefficients   Standardized 
Coefficients 
     T     Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) -1.725 1.312  -1.315 .190 
AC_MEET .025 .009 .101 2.684 .008 
D_INST -.083 .467 -.006 -.179 .858 
K_MGR .019 .010 .062 1.803 .073 
FCF 1.710E-013 .000 .056 1.642 .102 
CR -.004 .001 -.130 -3.255 .001 
ROA -1.452 .620 -.097 -2.340 .020 
LEV -.002 .226 .000 -.008 .993 
MB -2.991E-006 .000 -.004 -.114 .909 
LN_TA .832 .043 .769 19.506 .000 
AUDIT _ QUALITY .353 .151 .091 2.343 .020 
a. Dependent Variable: LN_FEE 
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4.2.3 The Effect of Audit Committee Activities towards Audit Fees 
Based on the results of the t test, the variable activity of the audit committee (AC_Meeting) has a p-value <0.10, so that 
the third hypothesis which states that there is a significant impact of audit committee activities towards audit fees, 
cannot be rejected. The coefficient direction, which has a positive value, shows that the more audit committee meetings 
held, the higher cost of the audit becomes.  
This result is match with what has been predicted by the theory but in the opposite direction, which states that number 
of audit committee meeting is one component that determines the audit committee effectiveness. The external auditor 
see it as a better environment control which will lower the level of risk control by the auditor and reduce the amount of 
work performed by external auditors (Tsui et al, 2001). This can happen due to all shareholders, both institutional 
shareholders and managerial shareholder, request the company to purchase and use a qualified audit service, which as 
consequence, the audit fees increase.  
The relationship of audit committee meetings is positive. It means that the more active internal audit committee (more 
meetings) then the higher impact of internal audit monitoring to a better corporate governance.  There is high demand 
to the quality of external audit in the company that has high commitment to implement corporate governance. Therefore, 
the scope of audit became wider that led to a high audit fee. This research supported the research of Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent (2006) stated that internal or external audit will increase supervision as whole in the company. 
The results of this study are not in accordance with Carcello et al. (2002) which found that there was no 
relationship between the audit committee and audit fees. This result is consistent with the research result of 
Lawrence et al. (2003) which found that the result of audit committee characteristics which are measured with the 
independency, expertise and frequent meetings, affected the audit fees significantly.  
4.2.4 The Influence of Free Cash Flow towards Audit Fee 
The free cash flow (FCF) as one of the control variable shows p-value ≥ 0.10 which means it does not impact 
audit fees significantly. This result is not in accordance with theory which has been stated that the positive level of 
free cash flow will influence the audit fee since the auditor will need more time to carefully inspect the 
performance and the usage of cash flow owned by Issuer Company.  In that way, FCF can not be use as control 
variable. This result also does not match with the research of Gul & Tsui (1998 and 2001) which found a positive 
relation between the high level of FCF and the audit fee.  
4.2.5 The Effect of Liquidity Ratio towards Audit Fee  
The other control variable in this study is ratio of liquidity which is measured by the current ratio (CR). T-test result 
indicates that CR has p-value < 0.10 with coefficient -0.004 which means the higher liquidity ration of a company, the 
lower audit fee becomes. It is consistent with the stated theory that if the issuer company has better level of liquidity, the 
audit fee will become lower because the external auditors find a low risk on its company, so they do not need to extend 
the scope of examination.  
4.2.6 The Effect of Profitability Ratio towards Audit Fee 
Ratio of profitability as a control variable measured by return on asset (ROA) has p-value < 0.10 with coefficient -1.452. 
It reflects a negative and significant ratio of profitability towards audit fee. This circumstance is in accordance with a 
theory which stated the higher profitability of a company could reduce the audit fee. It is because the auditor know since 
the company does a good performance, it will be able to press down its audit risk which will reduce the audit fee 
charged.   
4.2.7 The Effect of Solvency Ratio towards Audit Fee 
Solvency ratio measured by variable of leverage ratio (LEV) has p-value ≥ 0.10 which means leverage ratio as control 
variable does not have significant influence towards the audit fee. It is not match with theory stated a company with 
higher leverage level will hire auditor from the big four to raise the reliability of its financial report and to gain interest 
and trust from auditor, which as a consequence of this act, the audit fee needed will be higher.  
In addition, the auditor will charge a higher audit fee to the issuer company which has high level of solvency because it 
has a high risk of business and audit. Therefore, the audit need to be more careful in auditing and extending the scope of 
examination.  
This result is different from that of research done by Rusmin el al (2009) which found that a company with high 
leverage ratio will have increased the risk of controlling environment and be ended by the enhancement of audit fee. 
This dissimilarity gained because the research data shows that the majority of sampled company possesses a good level 
of leverage and uses auditor from non-big four.  
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4.2.8 The Effect of Firm Size towards Audit Fee 
Firm size variable measured by natural logarithm from total asset (LN TA) has p-value < 0.10 with coefficient 0.832. It 
indicates a significant influence of firm size towards audit fee i.e. the higher firm size, the higher audit fee becomes.  
This particular situation is in line with theory stated that big companies has had higher inherent risk and got more and 
complex transaction compared to small companies. Therefore, it will cost higher audit fee since the auditor need more 
time and resources to do inspection. This result also matches with that published by Abbottt et al (2003b) and Hav, 
Knechel & Ling (2008) which found a connection between firm size and audit fee.   
4.2.9 Market -to-Book Value of Equity (MB) to Fee Audit 
Market -to-book value of equity (MB) has p-value ≥ 0.10 which means there is no significant effect of market-to-book 
value of equity towards audit fee. It does not meet the theory stated that a big company which is measured by high 
market -to-book value of equity has a high inherent risk which will cause an increase of audit fee. This different result 
occurs because the investors have trust on a company with big market -to-book value of equity, so they will not require 
a qualified audit.  
4.2.10 The Effect of Audit Quality towards Audit Fee 
The t-test result reflects that the variable of quality control audit has p-value < 0.10 with coefficient 0.353 which means 
it provides a significant influence towards audit fee i.e. when a company uses audit assistance from the public 
accountant company, known as big four, the audit fee will become more expensive. It is in line with theory stated that 
high quality audit will cost more audit fee. It is also consistent with the previous research from Abbott et al. (2003b); 
Hay, Knechel & Ling (2008) and Rusmin et al. (2009). 
5. Conclusion, Limitation of the Study, And Recommendation  
5.1 Conclusion  
The result indicates that the first hypothesis which states there is an effect of institutional ownership towards audit fee, 
is rejected. This is proved because we do not find dissimilarities effect of institutional ownership of diffused and block 
holder towards audit fee. Different result reflected by the second and the third hypothesis which mention that 
institutional ownership and audit committee activities make significant influence towards audit fee. The bigger number 
of managerial ownership and audit committee activities, shown by the high number of meetings of audit committee, the 
higher audit fee becomes. It proves that the more often audit committee hold meeting, the auditor will notice an 
indication which shows a business complexity of its client, so they will charge a high audit fee because of a wide scope 
of audit.  
5.2 Limitation of the Study and Recommendation  
Limitation of this study is on extending of the small number of samples used for research. It is because the number of 
companies which have complete data as required for this research is limited. Moreover, variable of audit committee 
activity only consists of one characteristic i.e. number of meeting of audit committee in a year, without involving other 
characteristics such as competency or expertise of audit committee members, experiences, etc. The data obtained form 
BEI is not consistent in year to year. The numbers written on annual financial report of BEI is sometimes different form 
one year to another. There is also no company that put number of their audit fee, which has been paid, on the BEI’s 
report. Therefore, the researchers use number of professional fee as the data of audit fee. It results a less reliability of 
this study.  
Because of the limitation of the study, the researchers recommend next of future research to input variable of 
characteristics audit committee such as competency of audit committee members, educational background, and 
experience. In addition, ownership characteristic can be extend to ownership of institutional and non-institutional.   
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